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Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the 
demographic transition: 
A micro-level analysis of Sweden 1880–1970 
Martin Dribe
1 
Francesco Scalone
2 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Although demographers have long been interested in studying the historical fertility 
transition, there is still a lack of knowledge about disaggregated patterns. Identifying 
these patterns could help us to better understand the mechanisms behind the transition. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The aim of this paper is to explore social class differentials in fertility before, during, 
and after the fertility decline, in order to test hypotheses regarding a reversal of class 
differences during the transition. 
 
METHOD 
We use micro-level census data for Sweden 1880, 1890, 1900, 1960, and 1970 with 
individual-level information on occupation, which is used to measure class. Poisson 
regressions with parish-level fixed effects enable us to carefully  control spatial 
heterogeneity in measuring class differences in net fertility (child-woman ratios). 
 
RESULTS 
The relative differences were about as large in the early phases of the transition as they 
were in the 1960s. The fertility levels of the high-fertility classes were  about 40% 
higher than those of the low-fertility classes. In the early phases of the decline, the 
upper and middle classes had much lower net fertility than lower skilled workers, who 
had the highest fertility levels. However, there was no clear gradient from the highest to 
the lowest socioeconomic status. Instead, it appears that the upper and middle classes 
had  low fertility levels, while the fertility levels  of the remaining groups were 
unchanged, and therefore remained relatively high. In the 1960s,  members of the 
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middle class had the lowest fertility levels, while farmers and rural laborers had the 
highest fertility levels. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results only partly confirm the assumption  that there was  a reversal in class 
differences in the demographic transition. Class was found to be important, but the 
pattern was not characterized by a simple gradient. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity was 
shown to explain about half of the observed differences between classes. The observed 
pattern  suggests  that  the fertility transition can be attributed to  both innovation-
diffusion and the adjustment to new socioeconomic conditions. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The decline of fertility in the demographic transition has been a major theme in 
historical demography  for some time. Much of the literature focusing on the 
demographic aspects of the decline has sought to chart the process without actually 
explaining it. Other studies have  offered explanations for  the decline mainly at the 
macro level, identifying either innovation or adjustment processes as the main causal 
agents. Scholars have shown less interest in examining disaggregated patterns using 
micro-level analyses. 
One of the main issues that arises in discussions of the fertility decline is the extent 
to which  fertility  levels differ  according to socioeconomic status, and how these 
differences evolved over the fertility transition. Most demographers appear to agree that 
having  higher social status was associated with having  higher  fertility  prior to the 
transition,  but that this situation reversed during the transition, or even before it 
occurred (Livi-Bacci 1986; Skirbekk 2008). While it is therefore often assumed that 
higher social groups were forerunners in the decline (Haines 1992; Livi-Bacci 1986), 
the question of whether the change happened because new incentives were affecting the 
elite groups first (adjustment), or if it came about as a result of a diffusion of new ideas 
first adopted in these high-status groups (innovation), remains unresolved (see Haines 
1992). 
As some of the differences in fertility levels between socioeconomic groups may 
have also been related to spatial differences in socioeconomic structure, rather than to 
social status as such (Garrett et al. 2001); it is essential that researchers control for the 
spatial  aspect when analyzing socioeconomic stratification and fertility in national 
populations (see also Szreter 1996). 
The aim of this article is to study the socioeconomic differentials in fertility before, 
during, and after the transition. We use data from the Swedish censuses of 1880, 1890, Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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1900, 1960, and 1970. As these data cover the entire population (about five to seven 
million individuals in each census), we can investigate the socioeconomic pattern in 
considerable detail, while controlling for spatial heterogeneity. 
The main advantage of using census data is that, because of the broad coverage 
provided by the census, we are able study fertility differentials by socioeconomic status 
across space, without having to deal with the problems associated with using a small 
sample size. The data also offer quite detailed information on occupation, which allows 
us to classify individuals using standard class schemes. The main disadvantage of using 
historical census data (1880, 1890, 1900) is that they do not contain information on 
births by the age of the woman. Thus, when computing conventional fertility rates, we 
have to rely on indirect measures,  such as child-woman ratios.  However, previous 
analysis has shown that these measures are quite accurate in depicting socioeconomic 
fertility differentials, even in a context of moderately high mortality (Scalone and Dribe 
2012). The data are also lacking in other variables that might have helped to explain 
possible class differences. Hence, the main focus of our analysis will be on how class 
differences evolved over time, but our discussion of the possible explanations for these 
differences will be more tentative. 
In the first part of the paper, we provide some background information on the 
fertility transition in Sweden,  and summarize the main analytical framework for 
studying socioeconomic differences in reproductive behavior. We then  describe  the 
census data, provide some indirect estimates of fertility by socioeconomic status, and 
present the main empirical analysis.  
 
 
2. Background 
When we first look at the development of fertility in Sweden over a longer time span 
(see Figure 1), it is clear that the long-term level of fertility was quite stable until the 
last quarter of the 19th century: i.e., at between four and five children per woman, or 
around eight children per  married woman. Beginning around 1880,  period fertility 
declined steadily until the beginning of the 1930s, when it started to increase again. 
Between 1880 and 1900, the decrease was modest, but accelerated rapidly thereafter. 
This period between 1880 and 1930 marks the decline in Swedish fertility. It constitutes 
an important phase of the demographic transition, which took place about 100 years 
after infant mortality started its continuous decline (see, e.g., Hofsten and Lundström 
1976). Thus, when we look at the cohort fertility pattern, it is apparent that the decline 
started  with  the cohorts born around 1850, who would have been  in  their  prime 
childbearing ages in the early 1880s. 
 Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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Figure 1:  Fertility rates in Sweden 1800–1995
 
Source: Statistics Sweden (1999). 
Note: CTFR is the accumulated number of children at age 50. X-axis refers to year of birth for cohort fertility. 
 
We can also  see that marital  fertility followed  closely total fertility. This 
observation is in line with the well-established findings of previous research on the 
European fertility transition, which showed that the decline is mainly attributable to a 
decrease in marital fertility rather than to changes in nuptiality (Carlsson 1966; Coale 
and Watkins 1986). The fertility of the oldest age groups decreased the fastest, even 
though the decline started in all of the age groups over 25 at about the same time (see 
Dribe 2009). In terms of the relative contributions of different age groups to the fertility 
decline,  research has indicated that women of  the prime childbearing ages (25–40) 
contributed the most. Immediately before the fertility transition, most of the counties in 
Sweden  showed no  signs of parity-specific control;  this  implies that, with a few 
exceptions, the fertility pattern in pre-transitional Sweden was natural (Henry 1961). 
Nonetheless, the levels of marital fertility varied considerably between the counties, and 
these differences persisted during the transition, and even widened in relative terms 
(Dribe 2009). 
Previous studies have tended to support the assumption that the fertility decline 
could be linked to broad socioeconomic changes that took place in the late 19th and 
early  20th  centuries,  following the transition from an agricultural to an industrial 
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economy (see Dribe 2009). This transition was associated with sustained reductions in 
mortality,  higher  levels of urbanization, the  expansion of education,  and increased 
participation in market work by women. Yet the question of how these changes affected 
different socioeconomic groups has not been fully answered. 
Looking at the fertility decline in France, Germany, Britain, Norway,  and the 
United States, Haines (1992) showed that the socioeconomic differentials, as measured 
by occupation, generally widened during the transition. With the exception of France, 
the fertility decline in all of these countries was led by the middle and upper classes, 
while the agrarian populations were slower to change. The question is whether this 
pattern was the result of socioeconomic changes which  first affected the upper and 
middle classes, and did not reach the lower classes until later; or whether it was part of 
an older pattern in which innovation diffused from the upper to the lower social strata. 
According to Livi-Bacci (1986), European elite groups often led  the fertility 
transition, as fertility decreased among these groups much earlier than it did among the 
general population. He also argued that the early decline among  these groups was 
connected at least in part to the fact that they tended to live in cities. But he was 
uncertain about  whether the  socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the urban 
environment created the conditions for fertility change, or whether the elite groups had 
more specific characteristics which caused them to have fewer children. 
Evidence from other studies has pointed in the same direction. High status families 
in pre-transitional Sicily had considerably more surviving children than low  status 
families,  largely because of  a combination of mortality and higher marital fertility 
(shorter birth intervals) (Schneider and Schneider 1996). During  the  transition,  the 
higher social groups were the first to reduce their fertility,  with the poorer groups 
lagging behind. However, looking at Stockholm in the period immediately after the 
fertility decline in the 1930s, Edin and Hutchinson (1935) found higher marital fertility 
levels among the higher status groups, regardless of whether the status was measured by 
occupation, wealth, or education. It remains unclear whether these results only apply to 
the capital city, or can be generalized to the country as a whole. In pre-transitional 
Norway, however, the socioeconomic fertility differentials were quite modest, as the 
fertility rate was somewhat higher among the group with the highest status (but it is 
unclear whether the difference was statistically significant), and it was more or less 
identical among the middle and low status groups (Sogner, Randsborg, and Fure 1984). 
Nonetheless, the fertility decline started in the higher social groups, and then spread to 
the lower status groups. 
In his study of the  socioeconomic fertility differentials in Britain during the 
fertility decline, which was based on  the 1911 census, Szreter (1996) stressed the 
interplay of geography and class in the decline. Fertility decline was not simply diffused 
socially and geographically following a certain pattern. Instead, there were pronounced Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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regional differences within various social groups. These differences appear to be related 
to the perceived costs of childrearing. As conditions changed, new attitudes and values 
spread within these regional social groups through a changed discourse. This shift in the 
discourse  was, however, determined  to a large extent by  changes in the  economic 
conditions. Overall, Szreter downplayed the importance of socioeconomic differentials 
in fertility during the transition. But this conclusion has recently been challenged by 
Barnes and Guinnane (2012), who, using the same data, concluded that social class 
accounted for a large proportion (about two-thirds) of the fertility variance between 
couples in the 1911 British census. Woods, on the other hand, stressed that while there 
certainly were class differences in marital fertility in Britain around the turn of the 20th 
century, the decline occurred among the different classes at more or less the same time 
(Woods 2000: 116–121). 
More recently, following the publication of Clark’s A Farewell to Alms, economic 
historians have displayed renewed interest in the issue of fertility differentials by social 
class or wealth level (2007; see also Guinnane 2011). Based on data from wills, Clark 
showed that the number of surviving children was higher among richer families in pre-
industrial England, but also that these differences diminished well before the fertility 
transition (see  also Clark and Cummins 2009, Clark and Hamilton 2006).  Similar 
results have been found  for France (Cummins 2013)  and  for England using 
occupational data from family reconstitutions (Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp,  and Weisdorf 
2011). 
From a theoretical point of view, fertility decline is often viewed within the 
framework of innovation and adjustment (Carlsson 1966): the first model attributes 
fertility  to  new knowledge or attitudes regarding  fertility control, while the second 
model  sees the decline as having  resulted from  an adjustment of behavior to new 
circumstances and a greater motivation to limit fertility. In an alternative, but equally 
classic, formulation, Coale (1973, later developed by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 
2001) identified three conditions for fertility decline: namely, that people needed to be 
“ready,  willing and able.” These three conditions involve both adjustment and 
innovation. 
According to the innovation perspective, fertility before the decline was not 
deliberately controlled, but was instead “natural” (Henry 1961). Thus, marital fertility 
was not determined by the decision to stop having children at a certain parity, but rather 
by the length of the birth intervals. These intervals were in turn determined to a large 
extent by the length of time spent breastfeeding and the level of infant and early child 
mortality. Thus, according to this model, the fertility decline was mainly the result of a 
form of innovation in which couples started limiting their family size by ceasing to have 
children after reaching a set target (cf. Cleland and Wilson 1987; Coale and Watkins 
1986; Knodel and van de Walle 1979). In the words of Coale (1973), fertility came to Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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be “within the calculus of conscious choice,” which seems to imply that it was not 
before the transition. Deliberate birth control emerged through the cultural transmission 
of new ideas and changing attitudes and norms regarding the appropriateness of fertility 
control within marriage. The spread of such methods also entailed acquiring knowledge 
about how to limit fertility. Many scholars believe, however, that this knowledge was 
present long before the decline, even though it may not have been used for parity-
specific control, but rather for spacing births or avoiding childbearing in difficult times 
(see, e.g., Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; David and Sanderson 1986; Dribe and Scalone 
2010; Santow 1995; Szreter 1996; Van Bavel 2004). 
It might be generally expected that the higher social groups would be more likely 
to formulate and adopt these new ideas, as these groups were more open culturally, and 
appear to have felt an increasing need to distinguish themselves from the lower classes. 
These kinds of strategies of distinction practiced by members of the middle class have 
been shown to have been important for other aspects of family life, such as for marriage 
patterns (see Van de Putte 2007; see also Frykman and Löfgren 1987), and they may 
have been important for childbearing as well. The middle class and elite groups can also 
be expected to have been in a better position to acquire new knowledge about methods 
of birth control, to the extent that this information was not generally available before. In 
other words, assuming  that innovation diffusion  was important for the decline in 
fertility—which, after all, has been the orthodox view among historical demographers 
for a long time—we would expect to see that high social status was connected to an 
early decline in fertility (see Cleland 2001). 
According to the structural adjustment perspective, fertility decline is a response to 
changes in the motivations for having children. In the theoretical framework outlined by 
Easterlin and Crimmins (1985), both the demand and the  supply of children are 
important in explaining the high levels of pre-transitional fertility; as it is assumed that 
knowledge about birth control was available, and was applied once  the decline in 
fertility began. The supply of children is defined as the number of surviving children a 
couple would have if they made no conscious efforts to limit the size of the family 
(Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). Thus, it reflects natural fertility as well as child 
survival. The high levels of mortality of pre-transitional societies (low supply), together 
with  the  strong  demand for children,  meant  that  the  demand exceeded  the  supply. 
Following the mortality decline, the supply of children increased, which contributed to 
the decline in fertility (Galloway, Lee and Hammel 1998; Reher 1999; Reher and Sanz-
Gimeno 2007). However, declining mortality was only part of the explanation,  as 
fertility was reduced to a much greater extent than was needed to offset lower mortality. 
This implies that the fertility decline entailed a reduced number of surviving children; 
in other words, a decline in net fertility (see Doepke 2005). Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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It therefore appears that the changing demand for children was also an important 
factor in the fertility decline (see Brown and Guinnane 2002; Crafts 1984; Dribe 2009; 
Galloway, Hammel and Lee 1994; Mosk 1983; Schultz 1985). The demand for children 
can be defined as the number of children a couple would want to have if there were no 
costs associated with fertility control. In practice, the decision about how many children 
to have is generally based on the family’s income and the cost of children in relation to 
other goods that are directly related to social status, economic conditions,  and 
occupational levels. The motivations  for  having  children changed  following 
industrialization and urbanization, although  these processes  appear  to have affected 
socioeconomic groups differently. On the one hand, a desire for higher  levels of 
consumption among high status groups would have increased the opportunity costs of 
childbearing, and may therefore have contributed to a reduced demand for children. On 
the other hand, children may have been able to help the family by working in the fields 
or  by  assisting in supplementary activities from a relatively early age. Thus,  the 
economic benefits of having children might have been greater among the lower and 
middle class families in rural contexts. This could explain the delay in the fertility 
decline among these groups. 
In addition, as industrialization and urbanization increased the returns to education, 
the  demand for child quality also increased (Becker 1991). This led families to 
substitute quantity for quality, by having fewer children and investing more in each 
child. This quantity-quality trade-off has been viewed as an important explanation for 
the decline in fertility (see, e.g., Dribe 2009; Wahl 1992), as well as for the escape from 
the Malthusian trap and the emergence of modern economic growth (e.g., Galor 2005; 
see also Becker et al. 2010; Guinnane 2011). 
Empirical studies have also confirmed that smaller family sizes in the demographic 
transition became increasing connected to socioeconomic upward mobility among 
children (Bras, Kok, and Mandemakers 2010; Van Bavel 2006, Van Bavel et al. 2011). 
It may be expected that this shift toward increased investments in child quality would 
have occurred first among the higher status groups, partly because of the higher returns 
on education for people in higher status occupations, and partly because of the greater 
degree of knowledge and information about the new conditions among the members of 
these socioeconomic groups. 
After the transition, we expect to see that economic factors played an even bigger 
role in determining fertility, as deliberate fertility control was now widely accepted. 
Thus, potential controllers should have encountered much less resistance in the form of 
negative attitudes and prejudice. Nonetheless, especially in economic research, scholars 
have strongly emphasized that the spread of the contraceptive pill made fertility control 
much more efficient,  and thus  had  far-reaching  effects  on women’s education and 
career choices (Bailey 2010; Goldin and Katz 2002). It may therefore be expected that Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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highly educated women who were married to professional men would have had lower 
fertility, especially in the 1970 census. 
In addition to this possible effect of the contraceptive revolution of the 1960s, it 
may be assumed that fertility was connected to social class mainly through the families’ 
income levels and their aspirations for their children (child quality). In the economic 
fertility models, having a higher income, and thus belonging to a higher social class, 
provides  economic  opportunities for larger families (e.g.,  more spacious housing, 
domestic servants, higher levels of consumption). At the same time, the opportunity 
costs of parental time devoted to children would be expected to be higher in the upper 
classes, which should lead to lower fertility. Finally, the trade-off between the quantity 
and the quality of children may be expected to be stronger among middle-class families 
because they have higher aspirations for their children, which entails long periods spent 
in education and more expensive lifestyles (e.g., clothing and leisure activities). We 
may therefore assume that the income effect would be greater than all of the other 
effects and would lead to large families only among the very wealthy; whereas among 
the aspiring middle class,  the quantity-quality  trade-off  would be greater than  the 
income  effect, leading to low fertility even in contexts in which  women  are 
homemakers. In the countryside, on the other hand, this trade-off would be much less 
pressing: the comparatively spacious housing, the low educational levels, the traditional 
attitudes, and the low opportunity costs given the close proximity of work and home, 
would lead rural families to have relatively high fertility levels. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we expect to see a positive association between 
fertility and socioeconomic status before the fertility transition, at least in terms of total 
fertility (for marital fertility this is less clear). More relevant for this study is, however, 
the expectation that we will observe that the decline occurred earlier among the higher 
status groups,  leading to lower fertility levels among  these groups early in the 
transition. It appears likely that this pattern prevailed after the transition, except perhaps 
among  the upper classes.  Moreover, we expect to see substantial geographical 
differences in the extent of the fertility decline, both between the different regions and 
between  the  urban and the  rural areas. Because the patterns of socioeconomic 
stratification also differ regionally, we anticipate that the socioeconomic differentials 
will be smaller after we take the spatial patterns into account. 
 
 
3. Data 
We use micro-level data from five different Swedish censuses (1880, 1890, 1900, 1960, 
and 1970). Data for the first three censuses were digitized by the Swedish National 
Archives,  and are published by  the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP, see Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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Ruggles et al. 2011; Sobek et al. 2011), which has adopted the same format as the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Here we have used the original data 
coded by the Swedish National Archives within the project SweCens (funded by the 
Swedish Research Council). All of the registered individuals are grouped by household. 
Thus, each individual record reports the household index number and the person index 
within the household. The age, marital status, and sex of each person are also registered. 
The migration status indicates whether  a person was born in the  same county of 
residence or in another county or country. A specific variable also reports each person’s 
relationship to the household head. In addition, there are family pointer variables 
indicating the personal number within the household of the mother, the father, and the 
spouse, making it possible to link each woman to her own children and husband. In 
total, the 1880 census counted about 4.6 million persons in 1.2 million households from 
about 2,500 parishes, while the corresponding figures in the 1890 and 1900 censuses 
are 4.8/1.3 and 5.2/1.4 million, respectively. 
The data for the post-transition period come from the digitized censuses (Folk och 
bostadsräkningen) of 1960 and 1970, which were carried out by Statistics Sweden. The 
structure of the data is similar to that of the historical censuses. In addition to personal 
identifiers, there are household links and position, which makes it possible to identify 
children  living in the parental home. We have also linked the censuses to the 
multigeneration register  (Flergenerationsregistret)  maintained by Statistics Sweden, 
which contains all of the individuals who have resided in Sweden since 1960, and links 
them (based on personal numbers) to their biological and adopted children. In total, the 
1960 census counted 6.9 million individuals (2.3 million households), and the 1970 
census recorded 7.9 million individuals in 2.9 million households. 
From these five censuses, we created a sample of married women aged 15–54. 
This was done to ensure that all of the children aged 0–4 born to women aged 15–49 
were included. Only married women with their spouses present were included in the 
analysis.  The descriptive  statistics of these samples are presented  in Table 1. This 
process left us with a sample consisting of around 600,000 women in each of the first 
three censuses and of 1.3 million women in the two latter censuses. 
 
   Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of cross sections (%) 
 
1880  1890  1900  1960  1970 
SES (EGP)           
Higher professionals, managers (I)  2.7  2.7  2.9  6.1  6.7 
Lower professionals, managers (II)  2.2  2.4  2.8  17.7  23.1 
Routine non-manual workers (III)  0.6  1.0  1.5  7.4  7.0 
Petty bourgeoisie (IVa+IVb)  2.6  3.9  4.7  7.4  6.1 
Skilled workers (V+VI)  14.8  17.6  20.5  26.4  26.8 
Non-skilled workers (VIIa)  22.1  19.0  20.7  16.9  14.6 
Agricultural laborers (VIIb)  6.0  9.6  8.4  2.8  1.6 
Farmers (IVc)  42.0  38.3  33.2  9.8  5.4 
No class  4.6  3.6  3.5  3.3  4.0 
No occupation  2.3  1.9  1.6  2.3  4.8 
Age of woman           
15–19   0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.3 
20–24   6.0  5.4  6.5  6.8  8.6 
25–29   13.5  14.1  13.6  12.3  16.2 
30–34   16.7  17.9  15.8  14.9  14.6 
35–39   17.7  17.3  18.2  17.1  13.9 
40–44   16.2  16.2  17.4  17.0  14.8 
45–49   15.7  15.4  15.0  16.3  16.2 
50–54   13.7  13.2  13.0  15.1  15.5 
Age difference between spouses           
Wife older  27.9  26.9  26.0  15.8  13.8 
Husband 0–2 older  21.3  22.0  22.7  28.5  32.5 
Husband 3–6 older  25.1  25.6  26.3  34.3  35.3 
Husband>6 older  25.6  25.6  24.9  21.4  18.5 
Children >4 years at home           
No  30.9  29.9  29.6  32.6  34.3 
Yes  69.1  70.1  70.4  67.4  65.7 
Woman employed           
No  99.6  99.5  99.4  73.8  46.0 
Yes  0.4  0.5  0.6  26.2  54.0 
           
N  580,849  586,918  619,096  1,262,706  1,297,635 
 
Sources: 1880–1900: Micro censuses (SweCens), the Swedish National Archives; 1960–1970: Census data and the Multigeneration 
register, Statistics Sweden. Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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Our decision to use the  husband’s  occupation as the core information for 
identifying a family’s social class is based on a long tradition in social stratification 
research  (see, e.g., Van Leeuwen and Maas 2010). In the historical  census data, 
individual occupations were coded according to the Historical International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (HISCO; Van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles 2002). In the 
censuses of 1960 and 1970, the occupational data were coded according to a standard 
developed by Statistics Sweden (SSYK). Historical studies (19th  century) of social 
stratification and mobility often used the HISCLASS (Van Leeuwen and Maas 2011) or 
the  SOCPO (Van de Putte and Miles 2005) to categorize  occupations  according to 
social groups or classes. In contemporary research, a wider range of methods have been 
used to indicate class or socioeconomic status, all of them linked to different ideas and 
theories on class and stratification itself (see, e.g., Thålin 2007). In the current study, we 
have chosen use a scheme developed by Erikson, Golthorpe, and Portocarero (1979); 
hereafter  called the EGP.
3  Like the  HISCLASS,  the  EGP is based on skill level 
(manual, non-manual, etc.),  employment relations (employee, self-employed, 
employer), and sector (rural, non-rural) (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992:35–47). Here 
we use an eight-class version of this scheme: higher professionals and managers (I), 
lower professionals and managers (II), non-manual workers (III), petty bourgeoisie 
(IVa+b),  farmers (IVc), skilled workers (V+VI),  non-skilled workers (VIIa),  and 
agricultural laborers (VIIb). 
Table 1 gives distributions of the samples across the different classes. Farmers 
(including smallholders) appear to have dominated the social structure in 1880, which is 
indicative of the highly rural character of Sweden at that time. During the first half of 
the 20th century, a huge transformation of the social structure took place. This is clearly 
visible in the table: around 1900, about 35% of the population belonged to the farmer 
group, compared to only 5%–10% in 1960 and 1970. A similar decline can be seen for 
farm workers. Meanwhile,  the  shares  of skilled workers and service class workers 
increased greatly. 
In the analysis, we also controlled for age, the age difference between the spouses, 
the presence in the family of children over age four, and the employment status of the 
wife. The latter factor was difficult to measure because of the problems associated with 
farming.  Counting  all  of the  wives in the farming sector as employed would have 
produced much higher estimates than the ones presented here, which included only the 
occupations noted in the sources (i.e., the husband’s but not the wife’s occupation). For 
                                                            
3 To classify from the HISCO to the EGP, we used a transcode table developed, and kindly shared, by Ineke 
Maas at Utrecht University (Maas 2000). To classify the SSYK in 1960 and 1970 into the EGP, we used the 
transcode table developed by Erik Bihagen at SOFI, Stockholm University (http://www2.sofi.su.se/~ebi/). We 
are grateful to Erik for his valuable advice. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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example, the data indicated that only around 0.5% of all married women in the age 
group 15–54 were gainfully employed outside of a farm around 1900 (see Table 1). 
According to the census of 1920,  the corresponding figure was 4%  (Silenstam 
1970:56). While it is likely that a large number of married women did various kinds of 
work to supplement the  family income,  this work generally would not have been 
recorded in the sources. In later census  years the registration of female labor force 
participation appears to have been much more accurate, as the figure had risen to 26% 
in 1960 and to 54% in 1970. 
 
 
4. Methods 
Count variables with relatively low means, such as the number of own children per 
woman, frequently exhibit distributions that approximate Poisson distributions (Long 
1997). Therefore, a Poisson regression was adopted to estimate the association between 
social class and net fertility. More formally, the Poisson regression model assumes that 
the n observations yi are drawn from independent Poisson variables Yi with mean 𝜇i. On 
the basis of the observed characteristics, 𝜇 can be estimated as: 
 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 = exp  (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝗽 + 𝑣𝑗) 
 
where 𝜇ij is the number of children for woman i living in parish j, xij is a vector of k 
characteristics of the woman ij, the vector 𝗽 contains the k parameters of the individual 
covariates, and 𝑣j denotes parish-specific fixed effects. This model controls for parish-
level unobserved heterogeneity. As a comparison, we also estimated negative binomial 
models, which were robust against overdispersion in the data (see Cameron and Trivedi 
2009). They yielded practically identical results in terms of both the estimates and the 
p-values. In the tables below we only report the Poisson estimates. 
The aim was to control for a number of possible explanatory variables and spatial 
heterogeneity in estimating the association. The main covariate was social class, which 
was derived from the occupation of the husband. In the first step of the analysis, we 
estimated separate models for each census. We will present the model results reporting 
the incidence rate ratio (IRR), which expresses the relative change in the number of 
children for a unit change in the explanatory variable, holding all the other variables 
constant. 
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5. Net fertility by socioeconomic status 
For Sweden in this period, we have data that allow us to derive age-specific fertility 
(both total and by marital status) at the national and the county levels. However, these 
kinds of detailed demographic data are not available by socioeconomic status. 
Nationwide data on occupation at the  individual level  can be found only in the 
censuses.  Census data do not allow for  the computation of standard fertility rates 
(ASMFR, TMFR, etc.) because they do not contain records of births, but only of the 
children present in the family. We have therefore chosen to use an indirect measure of 
fertility called the child-woman ratio (CWR). The CWR has traditionally been defined 
as the number of children aged 0–4 per 1,000 women aged 15–49 (Shryock and Siegel 
1980). It is easy to see that the children under age five may have been born during the 
five-year period before the census date, when the women were up to five years younger. 
In a previous paper using the 1900 census, we compared the CWR to other standard 
fertility measures, as well as to another indirect method (the own-children method) (See 
Scalone and Dribe 2012). We demonstrated that the unadjusted CWR reflected rather 
well the socioeconomic differentials in terms of gross, or total, marital fertility. In the 
appendix,  we made the same comparison to mortality-adjusted CWR for  two other 
regions in Sweden. This  further supports the conclusion that the  socioeconomic 
differences in marital net  fertility closely resembles the socioeconomic pattern in 
marital fertility (see the appendix). In the 1960s, infant mortality and child mortality 
were so low that it is unlikely these rates would have greatly affected these kinds of 
estimates, despite the fact that the relative mortality differences were much larger than 
they were before (see Bengtsson and Dribe 2011). 
For the censuses of 1960 and 1970, we compared the number of children aged 0–4 
in the census to the number of children actually born based on the multigeneration 
register.  In 1960,  the CWR  exactly matched  the number of biological and adopted 
children according to the multigeneration register;  while in 1970,  the number of 
children was slightly higher according to the multigeneration register. This discrepancy 
is probably attributable to the greater frequency of divorce, after which children no 
longer live with both of their biological parents. Yet the socioeconomic differences 
were shown to be  highly similar regardless of  the measure  used.  To ensure 
comparability with the historical censuses, we used the number of children recorded in 
the censuses.  
The CWR can also be viewed as a measure of net fertility (i.e., fertility adjusted 
for mortality in the first five years of life). In many ways, this is a more informative 
measure of fertility, as we expect that the families cared more about the number of 
surviving children than the number of births. While the fertility transition came about in 
part as a response to lower mortality (e.g., Galloway, Lee, and Hammel 1998; Reher Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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1999; Reher and Sanz-Gimeno 2007; see also Dyson 2010), it is obvious  that the 
decline in net fertility was much more important in the long run (see, e.g., Doepke 
2005; Haines 1998). 
Table 2 shows the CWR (aged 0–4) by social class in the five censuses. We can 
immediately see that net fertility was lower in 1960/70, and was clearly consistent with 
the course of the fertility transition. The net fertility was also about 5% lower in 1900 
than it was in 1890, which shows that this was a period of decline. Meanwhile, it 
actually increased somewhat between 1880 and 1890. This increase might be 
attributable to a more rapid decline in mortality than in fertility in this period, which 
undoubtedly was a period of decline in aggregate total fertility (see Dribe 2009). 
Between 1960 and 1970,  net  fertility increased slightly,  reflecting  the second baby 
boom in Sweden in the late 1960s (see, e.g., Stanfors 2003). 
 
 
Table 2:  Mean number of children (aged 0–4) per woman by SES 
 
1880  1890  1900  1960  1970 
Higher professionals, managers (I)  0.78  0.72  0.68  0.36  0.38 
Lower professionals, managers (II)  0.91  0.85  0.72  0.39  0.39 
Routine non-manual workers (III)  0.90  0.83  0.69  0.34  0.30 
Petty bourgeoisie (IVa+IVb)  0.91  0.83  0.73  0.27  0.29 
Skilled workers (V+VI)  0.96  0.98  0.92  0.37  0.40 
Non-skilled workers (VIIa)  0.88  0.93  0.89  0.34  0.37 
Agricultural laborers (VIIb)  0.95  0.96  0.95  0.43  0.40 
Farmers (IVc)  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.33  0.28 
No class  0.83  0.82  0.84  0.37  0.33 
No occupation  0.58  0.56  0.54  0.25  0.31 
           
Total  0.87  0.89  0.85  0.35  0.37 
 
Note: Based on number of children aged 0–4 listed in the census. 
Sources: See Table 1. 
 
 
When we look at class differences, we can see that they did not decline over time 
if measured in relative terms. The difference between highest and lowest was about 
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(I) had the  lowest fertility,  while the skilled workers (V+VI)  and the agricultural 
laborers (VIIb) had the highest fertility. In 1960, the relative difference between the 
agricultural laborers with the highest fertility and the petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b) with the 
lowest fertility was almost 60%. In 1970, the maximum difference was 43%, with the 
agricultural laborers and the skilled workers having the highest fertility and the farmers 
having the lowest fertility. Thus, while the magnitude of the relative class differences in 
fertility did not change that much,  the pattern of higher  status groups  having low 
fertility and lower status groups having high fertility was not as clear. Moreover, we 
found no indication of higher fertility in the elite groups before the transition, as has 
sometimes been observed. Before reading too much into this, however, it is important 
to note that we have not controlled for the differences between these groups in terms of 
age or other variables.  
 
 
6. Regression results 
Table 3, panel A, displays rate ratios from Poisson regressions (they can be interpreted 
as relative net fertility rates) in a basic model without any covariates. The table gives 
basically the same picture as Table 2, indicating similar magnitudes—but different 
patterns—in the class differences before, during, and after the transition. In 1880, the 
skilled workers and the agricultural laborers had higher fertility than most of the other 
groups, while the elite group had the lowest. The upper-middle and the middle classes 
did not, however, have distinctly lower fertility. This pattern was quite similar in 1890, 
but the difference between the working classes and the middle classes was larger than in 
1880. The elite still had the lowest fertility of all of the groups. In 1900, the fertility of 
the upper and the middle classes had converged, and there were now two quite distinct 
groups: the working classes and the farmers on one hand, and the middle and the upper 
classes on the other.  In 1960/70, the petty bourgeoisie had  the lowest level of net 
fertility, while the higher and the lower classes had higher fertility levels. 
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Table 3:  Rate ratios from Poisson regression of number of children aged 0–4. 
Married women aged 15–54 
A. Basic model 
  1880  1890  1900  1960  1970 
  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t| 
SES (EGP) 
                   
Higher 
professionals, 
managers (I) 
1  ref  1  ref  1  ref  1  ref  1  ref 
Lower 
professionals, 
managers (II) 
1.17  0.000  1.18  0.000  1.06  0.000  1.10  0.000  1.03  0.000 
Routine non-
manual workers (III) 
1.16  0.000  1.16  0.000  1.02  0.313  0.96  0.000  0.80  0.000 
Petty bourgeoisie 
(IVa+IVb) 
1.18  0.000  1.16  0.000  1.08  0.000  0.77  0.000  0.75  0.000 
Skilled workers 
(V+VI) 
1.24  0.000  1.37  0.000  1.35  0.000  1.04  0.000  1.06  0.000 
Non-skilled workers 
(VIIa) 
1.13  0.000  1.30  0.000  1.31  0.000  0.97  0.000  0.98  0.000 
Agricultural 
laborers (VIIb) 
1.23  0.000  1.34  0.000  1.40  0.000  1.20  0.000  1.05  0.000 
Farmers (IVc)  1.10  0.000  1.18  0.000  1.23  0.000  0.94  0.000  0.74  0.000 
No class  1.07  0.000  1.14  0.000  1.23  0.000  1.04  0.000  0.87  0.000 
No occupation  0.75  0.000  0.78  0.000  0.79  0.000  0.70  0.000  0.82  0.000 
                     
Log likelihood  -709,660 
 
-725,803 
 
-757,607 
 
-969,760 
 
-1,013,000 
 
Overall p  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
Note: Basic model include no control variables.  
Sources: See Table 1. 
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B. Full model 
 
1880  1890  1900  1960  1970 
 
IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t|  IRR  P>|t| 
SES (EGP) 
                   
Higher 
professionals, 
managers (I) 
1  Ref  1  ref  1  Ref  1  ref  1  ref 
Lower 
professionals, 
managers (II) 
1.09  0.000  1.05  0.000  0.97  0.044  0.93  0.000  0.92  0.000 
Routine non-
manual workers 
(III) 
1.04  0.082  0.99  0.438  0.91  0.000  0.88  0.000  0.89  0.000 
Petty bourgeoisie 
(IVa+IVb) 
1.08  0.000  1.05  0.000  1.01  0.292  0.92  0.000  0.89  0.000 
Skilled workers 
(V+VI) 
1.12  0.000  1.16  0.000  1.14  0.000  0.90  0.000  0.92  0.000 
Non-skilled 
workers (VIIa) 
1.06  0.000  1.11  0.000  1.10  0.000  0.93  0.000  0.94  0.000 
Agricultural 
laborers (VIIb) 
1.06  0.000  1.12  0.000  1.13  0.000  0.97  0.008  0.94  0.000 
Farmers (IVc)  1.06  0.000  1.11  0.000  1.12  0.000  1.04  0.000  1.10  0.000 
No class  0.95  0.000  0.96  0.001  0.98  0.141  0.92  0.000  0.90  0.000 
No occupation  0.98  0.133  0.98  0.138  0.98  0.137  0.86  0.000  0.78  0.000 
                     
Log likelihood  -589,901 
 
-603,676 
 
-632,411 
 
-716,580 
 
-720,561 
 
Overall p  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
Note: Full models control for age of woman, age difference between spouses, children over age four, female employment, and 
parish-level fixed effects. 
Sources: See Table 1. 
 
Panel B shows the estimates of a full model, including controls for age, the age 
difference between the spouses, the presence of children over four, female employment, 
and parish-level fixed effects. This model appears to have been  rather  efficient in 
controlling for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, as the identification was based 
completely on intra-parish differences. The pattern was also rather different from that of Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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the basic model. Overall, the magnitudes in the differences were lower, which shows 
that a considerable portion of the class differences may be explained by factors other 
than class in itself (cf. Garrett et al. 2001; Scalone and Dribe 2012). We still found the 
lowest fertility in the highest classes during the transition. In fact, the pattern generally 
showed  two different groups; a low-fertility group consisting of the upper and  the 
middle classes (I, II, III, IVa+IVb), and a high-fertility group consisting of the rest; i.e., 
of the working classes and the farmers. The magnitudes of the differences were about 
10%  (the maximum difference between the farmers and the routine non-manual 
workers was about 30%). The main change between 1890 and 1900 was a decline in the 
net fertility levels of the upper-middle and the middle classes (II, III, IVa+b), implying 
a convergence to the level of the upper class. 
To delve more deeply into the SES differences prior to and early in the transition, 
we estimated a set of full models whereby the  SES was interacted with a variable 
indicating whether the county had or had not entered the transition (see Table 4). All of 
the counties in 1880, 1890, and 1900 with a Coale-Trussel “m” greater than 0.2 (which 
is commonly taken to indicate the presence of parity-specific birth control)  were 
considered as having been “in transition” (see Coale and Trussel 1974, 1978; data from 
Dribe 2009).  Overall,  the  pattern  was  rather similar in the  transition and the  non-
transition counties, but the class differences were larger in the transition counties. Thus, 
it  appears that the  socioeconomic differentials widened in the fertility transition  in 
Sweden as well (cf. Haines 1992). It is also interesting to note that the elite group (I) 
stands out as having had low fertility even in the pre-transition counties in 1880. In 
Stockholm city and Gotland (“in transition”) the differences were larger. It should be 
noted that the island of Gotland was always known for its low fertility (e.g., Gaunt 
1973; Wohlin 1915), and that Stockholm city did not have farmers and agricultural 
laborers; thus, the low fertility in these groups reflected geographic differences more 
than class differences. 
Outside of the agricultural classes, the elite group clearly had the lowest fertility 
level, and the other groups had similar levels among themselves. The large difference 
found between the higher professionals/managers and the lower professionals/managers 
is interesting, as it shows that the elite group led the transition, despite the fact that their 
fertility had been somewhat lower even before the transition started. In 1890 and 1900, 
it  is interesting to note that the upper classes had lower fertility even  in the “no 
transition” counties, but that the differentials were always bigger in the counties that 
had started the transition (which in these years included  more counties than just 
Stockholm city and Gotland). In other words, the results make it quite clear that there 
was no “survival of the richest” just before the fertility transition (i.e., in which the 
upper classes had higher fertility), but that the upper classes acted as forerunners once 
the decline was under way. It is impossible to tell from our data whether fertility among Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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the upper classes had been higher long before the transition; and then, as in England, 
underwent a pre-transition decline which led to a convergence with the levels of the 
other groups (cf. Boberg-Fazlic, Sharp, and Weisdorf 2011; Clark and Hamilton 2006). 
The micro-level results for Scania in southern Sweden indicate that this might well have 
been the case in Sweden as well (Bengtsson and Dribe 2014) 
 
Table 4:  Net effects of SES on number of children per woman by transition 
phase in county 
A. 1880 
 
In transition  No transition 
 
IRR  p  IRR  p 
Higher professionals, managers (I)  1.00  0.966  1  ref 
Lower professionals, managers (II)  1.15  0.308  1.09  0.00 
Routine non-manual workers (III)  1.12  0.088  1.03  0.17 
Petty bourgeoisie (IVa+IVb)  1.15  0.082  1.07  0.00 
Skilled workers (V+VI)  1.21  0.033  1.11  0.00 
Non-skilled workers (VIIa)  1.07  0.726  1.05  0.00 
Agricultural laborers (VIIb)  0.96  0.056  1.06  0.00 
Farmers (IVc)  1.05  0.847  1.06  0.00 
No class  0.83  0.041  0.94  0.00 
No occupation  0.00  0.000  0.99  0.33 
 
B. 1890 
 
In transition  No transition 
 
IRR  p  IRR  p 
Higher professionals, managers (I)  1.07  0.090  1  ref 
Lower professionals, managers (II)  1.13  0.077  1.04  0.00 
Routine non-manual workers (III)  1.05  0.068  0.98  0.38 
Petty bourgeoisie (IVa+IVb)  1.17  0.000  1.04  0.00 
Skilled workers (V+VI)  1.30  0.000  1.14  0.00 
Non-skilled workers (VIIa)  1.28  0.000  1.10  0.00 
Agricultural laborers (VIIb)  1.17  0.059  1.09  0.00 
Farmers (IVc)  1.16  0.222  1.10  0.00 
No class  0.97  0.720  0.95  0.00 
No occupation  0.00  0.000  0.98  0.21 
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Table 4:  (Continued) 
C. 1900 
 
In transition  No transition 
 
IRR  p  IRR  p 
Higher professionals, managers (I)  1.04  0.116  1.00  ref 
Lower professionals, managers (II)  1.02  0.058  0.96  0.01 
Routine non-manual workers (III)  0.91  0.204  0.88  0.00 
Petty bourgeoisie (IVa+IVb)  1.03  0.144  1.00  0.95 
Skilled workers (V+VI)  1.17  0.035  1.12  0.00 
Non-skilled workers (VIIa)  1.18  0.000  1.08  0.00 
Agricultural laborers (VIIb)  1.04  0.042  1.08  0.00 
Farmers (IVc)  1.18  0.153  1.14  0.00 
No class  0.98  0.697  0.97  0.04 
No occupation  0.00  0.000  0.97  0.21 
 
Note: Based on interactions in the full model. “No transition” is the reference category, and p-values refer to the base effects of SES 
in the regression. P-values for “In transition” refer to interaction effects. Counties in transition are those with Coale-Trussel 
“m”>0.2 (see Dribe 2009: 76). 
Sources: See Table 1. 
 
 
In the 1960s, these patterns were quite different (see Table 3). According to the 
1970 estimates, the rate ratios span a wider range than in 1900, amounting to a 25% 
higher net fertility among the  farmers than among  the petty bourgeoisie.  Thus,  the 
farmers stand out as having been the group with the highest fertility in both 1960 and 
1970. The petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b) and the non-manual workers (III) had the lowest 
fertility levels, while the upper class (I) had the second-highest marital fertility level 
after the farmers. If we exclude the farmers from the picture, we can see a clear U-
shaped pattern in 1960; this pattern was a little weaker in 1970, but was qualitatively 
the same. The reasons for the higher fertility levels in these different classes could, of 
course, be totally different: among the upper classes, the high incomes of the male 
breadwinner families  may  have  meant  that there were few restrictions on  fertility; 
whereas among the working classes, the most efficient contraceptives might have been 
adopted later, or positive attitudes toward larger families may have lingered. Farmers 
also faced fewer constraints on fertility because they worked at or close to home, and 
they also had more space in their houses. To some extent a greater demand for children 
to work on the farm may also have played a role, although the labor provided by 
children would have been much less of a factor in 1970 than it was in the past. The 
aspiring middle classes (especially III, IVa+b), on the other hand, are the groups for 
which we expected to find the strongest trade-off between the number of children and Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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investments in children. Middle-class parents often had educational ambitions for their 
children at a time when the costs of having children in education were substantial; not 
primarily because of school fees, but because schoolchildren were not working and 
contributing to the upkeep of the household. Thus, the low fertility in this group makes 
sense from an economic point of view. 
These results were all based on separate cross-sections. In order to corroborate the 
results in a more dynamic perspective, we also linked the censuses and studied how an 
individual’s class in one census affected the number of children aged 0–9 he or she had 
in the subsequent census. We linked the censuses of 1880 and 1890 as well as the 
censuses of 1890 and 1900. These links were based on a probabilistic linking procedure 
using Jaro-Winkler scores for first name and last name similarities (Christen 2008).
4 
The results showed that 52% of the married women aged 15–44 in 1880 could be linked 
to the 1890 census with the same spouse present. The corresponding linkage ratio for 
1890/1900  was  58%. This gave us  about 213,000 married women in the 1880/90 
sample and 242,000 in the 1890/1900 sample. Linking the censuses of 1960 and 1970 
was more straightforward,  as  these censuses  included  unique individual identifiers 
based on the personal numbers in the registers. Using this simple procedure, we linked 
87.7% of the married women aged 15–44 in 1960 to the 1970 census with the same 
spouse present. The results obtained were very similar to the cross-sectional results. 
This is reassuring, as we can see that the patterns were the same when we followed the 
same women over a 10-year period as they were when we looked at a cross-section 
(results not shown). The upper and the middle classes in 1890 had fewer children in 
1900 than the other groups, and the farmers in 1960 had more children under age 10 in 
1970 than the other groups. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Class differences in fertility have not received as much scholarly attention as class 
differences in mortality, a  topic  for  which  there is a vast body of literature  on the 
periods  before, during,  and after the demographic transition. Moreover,  in fertility 
research most of the attention has been devoted to the  other determinants, such as 
education, religion, labor force participation, and public policy. Based on the research 
available, the conventional wisdom among scholars seems to be that the  class 
differences in fertility reversed during the demographic transition: i.e., the upper classes 
had higher fertility prior to the transition, and lower fertility after the transition. 
                                                            
4 We are grateful to Björn Eriksson at the Department of Economic History, Lund University, for his valuable 
help and advice in doing the linkage. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 15 
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Our results for Sweden only partly confirm this view. There was no indication that 
elite groups had higher fertility than the other groups immediately before the transition. 
Instead, most of the evidence suggests that the class differences in fertility were smaller 
before the transition than they were early in the transition or after the transition. The 
class differences were about as large in the early phases of the transition as they were in 
the 1960s. The gap between the high and the low fertility classes was around 40% or 
more. Before the transition, the gap was only about 20%. 
In the early phases of the decline, the upper and the middle classes had much lower 
net fertility than the lower skilled workers. However, there is no clear gradient going 
from highest to lowest socioeconomic status. Instead, it appears that the upper and the 
middle classes had low fertility, while the rest of the classes had a relatively uniform 
level of high fertility. In the 1960s, the middle class had the lowest fertility level; while 
the farmers, the rural laborers, and the elite had the highest levels. 
At the turn of 20th century, the upper classes clearly led the other groups in the 
fertility decline. The elite groups had the lowest fertility levels in the 1880 and 1890 
censuses,  and  the  middle  classes  quickly converged  to  these low  levels  in 1900. 
Meanwhile, the other social groups had almost the same fertility levels as they did 10 
years before. It thus appears that, despite the socioeconomic changes that were 
occurring at the onset of the fertility decline, a kind of barrier continued to isolate the 
leaders in this trend, which may have prevented the diffusion of new ideas regarding 
contraception to  all the social groups.  On the other hand,  if we look  at the post-
transition period,  we can see that reproductive behavior became  more diversified, 
changing in response to the constraints and the needs of each social class. At least to 
some extent, this pattern was different from the pattern found in Britain. According to 
Woods (2000), the fertility decline there occurred almost simultaneously in all of the 
classes, even though there were considerable class differences in marital fertility levels 
before the decline which persisted in the transition. This led Woods to conclude that 
there was no social diffusion in the fertility transition (Woods 2000:121). 
Overall, our findings provide no clear support for the assumption that there was a 
reversal of class differences in marital fertility in the demographic transition, whereby 
the  upper classes had high fertility and  lower classes had  low fertility  prior to the 
transition, and the situation reversed after the transition. It is clear that class mattered, 
but the pattern has no simple gradient. Instead, the specific conditions of the different 
classes in terms of their income, education, attitudes, and aspirations for their children 
created different incentives which then determined the outcome. Geography was also 
important. As we showed in a previous analysis of the 1900 census (Scalone and Dribe 
2012), spatial heterogeneity explained up to half of the class differences on the national 
level. Thus, it is important to look at class differences in a spatial context. Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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Nonetheless,  even after we included  powerful controls for unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity, we found clear class differences in net fertility, and the basic pattern was 
more or less unchanged. The finding that the upper classes had low fertility in the early 
phases of the transition is consistent with explanations  which focused  both on the 
adjustment of fertility to the new socioeconomic circumstances, and on the diffusion of 
new attitudes toward birth control and the ideal number of children. We expected to 
find that both of these processes affected the upper and the middle classes first. Our 
finding that the real elite (the highest group comprising about 3% of the population) had 
lower fertility than the other groups in 1880, and that the upper-middle class (lower 
managers and professionals) followed their lead in 1890–1900; may be taken as an 
indication of the importance of innovation-diffusion factors, as the need for economic 
adjustment should not have been too pressing among the elite group, for whom the 
opportunity costs of childbearing would have been low due to their low rates of female 
labor force participation and their high material standard of living, which would have 
entailed both spacious housing and the help of domestic servants. It may well have been 
the case that new attitudes toward birth control developed and spread through society, 
affecting the behavior of the most affluent groups first, and the behavior of the middle 
classes later. 
The low fertility of the middle class after the transition seems to be attributable to 
a trade-off between the quantity and the quality of children. After we controlled for 
female employment and spatial differences, these groups still had low fertility; most 
likely because they had high educational aspirations for their children, which meant that 
they could not afford to have a large number of children. This led them to lower their 
fertility levels below those of both the higher status and the lower status groups. The 
rather high fertility levels  of the elite in this period may in part have been  a 
consequence of their high income levels, which lowered the relative price of having 
children. But it may also have been an indication of the early adoption of new, more 
fertility-prone behavior. 
In conclusion, our analysis has shown that social class clearly mattered for the 
course of the fertility transition, and that it continued to matter in the post-transition 
period. These class differences cannot fully be explained by differences in female labor 
force participation or  residential patterns. Instead, they  most likely reflect other 
economic  realities of families in these groups,  as well as possible differences in 
attitudes and norms surrounding childbearing,  which combined to produce  quite 
dramatic differences in the number of children  born to these families.  Determining 
which of the possible explanations were most important in producing these class 
differences is beyond the scope of this article, as we would require much more detailed 
data to investigate this question. 
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Appendix. A comparison of CWR and mortality-adjusted CWR. 
The marital CWR has been defined as the number of children  aged 0–4 per 1,000 
married women aged 15–54 (Shryock and Siegel 1980). It is easy to see that the 
children under age five  may have been born during the five-year period before the 
census date, when the women were up to five years younger. 
 
  𝐶𝑊𝑅 =
𝑃0−4
𝑃𝑓15−54
× 1000  (1) 
 
It is possible to adjust the CWRs by taking mortality into account. Dividing the 
estimated number of births in the previous five  years by the estimated amount of 
women 2.5 years before the census time, the adjusted CWR0–4 is: 
 
  𝑎𝑑𝑗.𝐶𝑊𝑅 =
𝑃0−4×�
500000
𝐿0−4
�
�(𝑃𝑓20−59×�
𝐿15−54
𝐿20−59
�+𝑃𝑓15−54�×0.5
  (2) 
 
This adjustment can be used to test the influence of socioeconomic mortality 
differentials on estimates of net fertility (standard CWR). To do this we need SES- and 
age-specific mortality rates, which are not available for Sweden as a whole at the time 
under consideration. We have therefore constructed  a sensitivity analysis of  three 
different regions for which this  information is available: Malmöhus county, 
Västerbotten county, and Stockholm city. The mortality data came from five parishes in 
Malmöhus county (The Scanian Economic-Demographic Database, Bengtsson, Dribe, 
and Svensson 2012), the parish of Skellefteå in Västerbotten county (The Demographic 
Database, Umeå University), and the city of Stockholm (The Roteman Archive).
5 Based 
on the mortality data and the county-level CWR, we calculated the adjusted CWR. 
The SES-  and  the  age-specific mortality rates were calculated for the period 
1890-1900 and then compared to the CWR in 1900. In order to reduce problems of 
random variation in the  mortality data,  we did the calculations using a condensed 
HISCLASS scheme which had  five classes: elite (HICLASS 1–5),  skilled workers 
(HISCLASS 6, 7 and 9), farmers (HISCLASS 8), farm workers (HISCLASS 10, 12), 
and unskilled workers (HISCLASS 11). 
Figure  A.1 shows the unadjusted marital CWRs compared to two different 
adjusted marital CWRs. The CWRs were  corrected by adopting the age-specific 
mortality rates of the corresponding social class. Looking at Figure A.1, it is clear that 
                                                            
5 We are grateful to Göran Broström, Sören Edvinsson, and Joseph Molitoris for providing the data needed to 
do these calculations. Dribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
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the fertility pattern by socioeconomic status did not change regardless of the mortality 
model we adopted. Obviously, the mortality correction had  some effects, but not 
enough to change the basic fertility pattern by socioeconomic status. These results 
clearly show that in Sweden at the end of the 19th century, differences in the number of 
living children per women explained most of the socioeconomic differences in net 
fertility, whereas the socioeconomic differences in mortality seem to have had only a 
limited role. In other words, the discussion in the article on class differences in net 
fertility generally applies to the patterns for marital fertility as well. 
 
Figure A1:  Marital CWR and mortality-adjusted CWR for Malmöhus county, 
Västerbotten county and Stockholm city in 1900 (per 1,000 women) 
A. Malmöhus county 
 
 
Source: The Scanian Demographic Database (Bengtsson, Dribe and Svensson 2012) and SweCens, see Table 1. 
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B. Stockholm city 
 
 
Source: The Roteman’s Archive and SweCens, see Table 1. 
 
   
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Elite Skilled Farmer Farm
Workers
Unskilled Missing
CWR adj. CWRDribe & Scalone: Social class and net fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition 
464    http://www.demographic-research.org 
C. Västerbotten county 
 
 
Source: The Demographic Database, Umeå University and SweCens, see Table 1. 
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